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Abstract 
 
This paper presents results from an experiment designed to study the effect produced on 
strategy choices when a subject reports risk preferences before engaging in a 2 2×
coordination game. The main finding is that the act of answering a questionnaire about one’s 
own risk preferences significantly alters strategic behavior. Within a best-response 
correspondence framework, this result can be explained by a change in either risk preferences 
or beliefs. We find that self-reporting risk preferences induces an increase in subjects’ risk 
aversion while their beliefs remain unchanged. Our findings raise some questions about the 
stability of strategy choices in coordination games. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The difficulty in predicting strategy choices in games with multiple equilibria is a central 
feature of coordination games. Both the theoretical and the experimental literature is 
organized around the idea of determining what, if any, equilibrium point can be expected 
under different specifications of the game, such as complete vs. incomplete information 
games (Harsanyi and Selten 1988, Carlsson and van Damme 1993), games with a larger 
number of players vs. games with a smaller number of players (Van Huyck et al. 1990), 
games with preplay communication vs. games without preplay communication (Cooper et al. 
1992), games with local interaction vs. games without local interaction (Berninghaus et al. 
2002). 
Despite the profusion of research on coordination games, however, there are important 
aspects of decision-making analysis which are left intact by both the theoretical and the 
experimental literature. Namely, inductive methods of equilibrium choice are hardly 
considered in the theories on equilibrium selection in coordination games which are all based 
on the assumption that a subject’s decision-making process is based on some sort of 
deductive analysis. Deductive equilibrium analysis prescribes what strategy choices rational 
players should make under the assumption of common knowledge of rationality, if they use 
only the information provided by the game, i.e. strategy space and payoff structure. In other 
words, subjects’ strategy choices are assumed to be independent of historical accidents and 
dynamic processes. Whether this assumption is a good proxy of the real decision-making 
process is an empirical question. Van Huyck et al. (1990), for example, report experimental 
results that are not consistent with the predictions of deductive methods. To our knowledge, 
no experimental research effort has yet been dedicated to the question of whether strategic 
behavior is influenced by factors external to the coordination game and not related to it in any 
obvious way. Previous experimental studies have analyzed the effect of different 
specifications of the game on strategy choices but none of them even touches on the topic of 
whether specifications unrelated to the coordination game could influence subjects’ strategic 
behavior. For example, it is found that the majority of subjects tend to coordinate on the 
Pareto superior or Pareto inferior equilibrium depending on the number of players (Van 
Huyck et al. 1990, 1991, 1993) and the number of iterations (Berninghaus and Ehrhart 1998). 
Moreover, preplay commitment (Van Huyck et al. 1992, Cooper et al. 1992, Clark and Sefton 
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2001), recommendation (Brandts and MacLeod 1995, Croson and Marks 1996), optimization 
premium (Battalio et al. 2001), loss avoidance principles (Cachon and Camerer 1996), 
salience (Metha et al. 1994), and local interaction (Berninghaus et al. 2002) are reported to 
exert influence on subjects’ decision choices.  
In this paper we aim to achieve two goals. The first is to fill the above-mentioned gap by 
providing experimental evidence of how nonstrategic decision situations encountered by 
subjects before playing a one-shot 2 2×  coordination game and not related to the 
coordination game systematically change strategic behavior. Inferences are drawn on whether 
behavior observed in the laboratory is consistent with decision making based on deductive 
analysis. The second goal is to provide evidence on whether neutrally framed nonstrategic 
decision situations change subjects’ preferences. Both of these objectives are addressed by 
conducting a single laboratory experiment whose results are then interpreted accordingly. 
We focus on the question of whether the act of answering a short, neutrally framed 
questionnaire about one’s own risk preferences systematically changes strategic behavior in a 
subsequently played 2 2× coordination game. The questionnaire consists of three questions in 
which subjects were asked to report their own risk preferences. The questions were carefully 
chosen so that they did not suggest any level of risk tolerance—risk loving, risk neutral or 
risk averse. Immediately after completing of the questionnaire, the subjects in a test group 
were asked to make a strategy choice in a 2 2×  coordination game characterized by two 
Pareto-ranked pure strategy Nash equilibria. The strategy choices made by the test group 
participants were then compared with the strategy choices made by control group participants 
who were asked to play only the coordination game.  
Our experimental results reveal significant evidence that answering a questionnaire about 
one’s own risk preferences systematically changes strategy choices made in a subsequently 
played 2 2×  coordination game. Around two thirds of the subjects who played the 
coordination game without having previously answered the questionnaire chose the Pareto- 
dominant strategy in the game. Once we let subjects answer the questionnaire before they 
played the game, this proportion was reduced to one half. Furthermore, we find that 
consistent with the best-response correspondence framework, both risk preferences and 
beliefs are important for the determination of strategy choices. In particular, there is 
significant evidence that subjects who play the risk-dominant strategy are on average more 
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risk averse and hold less optimistic beliefs about the proportion of people who would play the 
risk-dominated strategy than subjects who choose the risk dominated strategy.  
Our results suggest an additional research question: If subjects do play best-responses, could 
the change in strategic behavior induced by answering the questionnaire be explained by a 
change in subjects’ risk preferences or a change in subjects’ beliefs? With the help of 
specially designed treatments in which subjects’ first-order beliefs are elicited, we address 
this research question and find little support for the idea that the act of answering the 
questionnaire changes beliefs. This result implies that the systematic change in strategy 
choices after answering the questionnaire is induced by a change in subjects’ risk preferences. 
In particular, after answering the questionnaire about one’s own risk preferences, subjects 
should have become on average more risk averse. This latter result raises some questions 
about the stability of preferences assumption of standard economic theory.  
Our observations are related to the psychological literature on priming but there exist 
important differences between the two. The term priming is used to describe how a first 
stimulus activates parts of a particular representation or association in memory before an 
action is carried out, and explains that this activation influences the behavior in the 
subsequently completed task. Bargh et al. (1996) and Bargh (2007) report interesting 
experimental results. In one experiment, subjects were asked to construct a grammatically 
correct four-word sentence from a set containing five words. Ten five words sets were given. 
In one condition, many of the given words referred to being old. In another condition, many 
of the given words referred to being young. The effect of this simple language task was that 
subjects from the “old” condition walked significantly more slowly out of the office than 
subjects in the “young” condition. In another experiment, Dijksterhuis and van Knippenberg 
(1998) primed the participants in one condition with the stereotype of a professor (or the trait 
intelligent) and in another condition with the stereotype of soccer hooligans (or the trait 
stupid) and then observed that the participants in the “professor” condition performed 
significantly better in a general knowledge test than the participants in the “soccer hooligans” 
condition.  
In our experiment, we observe a similar pattern—the completion of one task influences 
behavior in a subsequent task. In contrast, to the priming literature, however, in the first task 
(the questionnaire) we do not prime any trait (risk loving, risk neutral or risk averse), rather 
we use a neutral framework. Consequently, the observation that the act of answering the 
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questionnaire makes participants become on average more risk averse when playing the 
coordination game cannot be explained as resulting from priming. 
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section introduces the baseline coordination game 
and discusses a framework of strategy choices based on the reaction correspondence structure 
of the game. Section II presents the research hypotheses. We then in Section III describe the 
experimental design and procedure and analyze the results. In Section IV, we offer a short 
discussion. Section V concludes. 
I. A Pure Coordination Game—Reaction Correspondence 
Framework of Strategy Choices 
 
We define the baseline game as a one-shot symmetric 2 2× normal form coordination game 
with two Pareto-ranked pure strategies Nash equilibria ((A, A) and (B, B)) and one 
equilibrium in mixed strategies (Figure 1). 
  Column Player 
  A B 
 
Row Player 
A 200, 200 0, 125 
B 125, 0 150, 150 
 
FIGURE 1: The Baseline Game 
 
The entries of the payoff matrix are expressed in experimental currency units. The players 
have complete information about the strategy space and the payoff function.  
 
One approach to the strategy selection problem could be derived from the game’s reaction 
correspondence (best-response correspondence). Best-response correspondences are drawn as 
a line for each player in a unit square strategy space. Figure 2 depicts the best-response 
correspondence of the baseline game. 
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FIGURE 2: Best-response Correspondence 
 
The long dash (dash dot) line represents the optimal probability with which the Row 
(Column) player plays A as a function of the probability with which the Column (Row) 
player plays A (because of the symmetry of the game, from now on we will concentrate our 
attention only on the Row player). Based on her best-response correspondence, the Row 
player will choose to play A (B) if she believes that the Column player plays A with 
probability β  larger (smaller) than β , where the threshold value β corresponds to the mixed 
strategies equilibrium and is the solution of the following equation: 
(1) 
!
(200) (0)(1 ) (125) (150)(1 )u u u uβ β β β+ − = + −  
(2) 
(150)
(200) (150) (125)
u
u u u
β =
+ −
 
with ( )u x being the Row player’s utility function. Analogously, γ  is the probability with 
which the Column player mixes her strategies in the mixed strategy equilibrium. We use 
different notation for each player in order to account for the fact that subjects might be 
characterized by different utility functions. By definition, β  (γ ) is the probability with 
which players randomize between their strategies so that they are indifferent to the choice of 
strategy A  or strategy B . Each intersection of the two reaction correspondences represents an 
1
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equilibrium point. From Figure 2, it could be easily seen that the baseline game has three 
equilibria— ( ),A A , ( ),B B  and ( ),β γ , with the latter being the mixed strategies equilibrium. 
The definition of reaction correspondence implies that a player’s strategy choice is 
determined by her beliefs and the threshold probability β  (γ ) which depends on her utility 
function. That is, under the assumption of value maximizing subjects who play best-
responses, a strategy choice is a function of players’ beliefs and risk preferences. A 
comparative static analysis shows that the theoretical effects of beliefs optimism work 
opposite to the effects of risk aversion. For example, a risk-loving player could choose either 
Strategy A or B depending on how optimistic (pessimistic) her beliefs are. The same holds 
for a risk-averse player. This creates an identification problem—the independent effects of 
risk preferences and beliefs cannot be distinguished by simply observing a strategy choice. 
Any complete analysis of strategic behavior should, therefore, explicitly address the interplay 
between risk preferences and beliefs. The importance of this point is well reflected in the 
work of Dickinson (2009) who contrary to previous bargaining research does not examine 
risk attitude and beliefs in isolation but rather considers their interplay. 
Existing literature on coordination games has dedicated little effort to decompose the effects 
of risk preferences and beliefs. The theoretical research avoids dealing with the identification 
problem by considering payoff matrices given in terms of utilities rather than in monetary 
units (e.g. Nash 1951, Harsanyi and Selten 1988, Carlsson and van Damme 1993, Selten 
1995). The advantage of this approach is that one needs not know players’ risk preferences. 
Therefore, beliefs receive most of the attention in the mathematical modeling that follows. 
The experimental studies are often designed to test the predictions of certain theoretical 
models. However, in experimental laboratory settings the use of utilities in the payoff matrix 
is impossible and the fact that the theoretical analysis is based on utilities and the actual 
experiment on monetary units is often not accounted for (e.g. Batalio, Samuelson and Van 
Huyck 2001, Nyarko and Schotter 2002). Other researchers report that the risk neutrality 
assumption holds for the average participant in their experiments and once again avoid 
explicitly dealing with the identification problem (e.g. Biel 2009). The overlooked effect of 
the interplay between risk preferences and beliefs in coordination games may create several 
problems that could eventually invalidate experimental results. Among these are incorrect 
estimation of the mixed strategy, Pareto-dominant and risk-dominant equilibria, incorrect 
conclusions about whether subjects play best-responses to their own stated beliefs, and lack 
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of understanding about the reasons why subjects choose different strategies in theoretically 
equivalent situations. The focus of the current research is on the last problem.  
II. Research Hypotheses 
 
The aim of this paper is to understand in what way a neutrally framed questionnaire about a 
subject’s own risk preferences influences the strategy choices made by that subject in a 
subsequently played one-shot coordination game. The internal consistency of preferences 
assumption of standard economic theory postulates that in theoretically equivalent situations 
people should always choose the same alternative. In addition, equilibrium selection 
principles based on deductive analysis prescribe that strategy choices are independent from 
historical accidents and dynamic processes. The implications of these two normative theories 
lead us to our first research hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1: The act of answering a questionnaire about one’s own risk preferences   does 
not change strategic behavior in a subsequently played 2 2× coordination 
game. 
In the best-response correspondence framework, discussed in the previous section, it was 
argued that both risk preferences and beliefs are important for the determination of strategy 
choices; and that, depending on the individual distribution of beliefs, either strategy might be 
chosen by players characterized by any risk attitude. Following the insights of previous 
research (e.g. Schmidt et al. 2003, Heinemann et al. 2009 and Goeree et al. 2003) that 
strategic behavior in games is related to subjects’ risk preferences, we derive our second 
research hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 2: The players’ risk preferences determine strategy choices made in the 2 2×
coordination game. 
Analogously, from the reaction correspondence framework, we would expect the same 
causality to apply also to subjects’ beliefs. Confirmation of the intuition about the importance 
of beliefs in the determination of strategic behavior has already been reported in the literature 
(e. g. Nyarko and Schotter 2002 and Costa-Gomes and Weizsäcker 2008). 
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Hypothesis 3: The players’ beliefs determine their strategy choices in the 2 2× coordination 
game. 
Our results reveal significant evidence that the act of answering the questionnaire does indeed 
induce a change in strategic behavior in the subsequently played 2 2× coordination game. 
This leads us to ask and investigate an additional research question about the mechanism 
behind the observed results. Referring again to the reaction correspondence framework 
presented in Section I, we know that a strategy choice is a function of risk preferences and 
beliefs. In addition, our experimental data proved to be consistent with the second and third 
research hypotheses. Our presumption, therefore, is that any change in strategic behavior 
should have been induced by a change in either risk preferences or beliefs. 
Hypothesis 4: The act of answering the questionnaire about their own risk preferences 
changes subjects’ beliefs. 
Hypothesis 5: The act of answering the questionnaire about their own risk preferences 
changes subjects’ risk preferences. 
III. The Experiment 
a. Experimental Design 
 
We designed an experiment consisting of five treatments. In the first treatment (Treatment 
Q), subjects were asked to fill out a short questionnaire about their own risk preferences. In 
the second treatment (treatment G) subjects were asked to select a strategy in the 2 2×
coordination game presented in Figure 1. Subjects from treatment three (treatment Q_G) 
were instructed to first fill out the questionnaire about their own risk preferences and then 
play the 2 2× coordination game. In the fourth treatment (treatment B_G), subjects were 
asked to state their first-order beliefs and then play the 2 2× coordination game. Finally, 
subjects from the fifth treatment (Q_B_G) first answered the questionnaire, then stated their 
first-order beliefs and subsequently played the 2 2× coordination game.  
In all treatments consisting of more than one task, subjects performed the individual tasks one 
after the other with the only waiting time in between being associated with the time needed to 
collect the answer sheets from the first tasks and distribute the instructions and the answer 
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sheets for the second (and third) tasks. Table 1 summarizes the decision situations involved in 
all five treatments as well as their sequence. 
  Questionnaire  Beliefs  Coordination Game 
  1 2 3  1 2 3  1 2 3 
Treatment 1            
Treatment 2           
Treatment 3            
Treatment 4           
Treatment 5            
 
TABLE 1: Treatments and Tasks 
In all treatments involving first answering the questionnaire and then performing additional 
tasks, subjects knew from the very beginning of the experiment that the experiment consisted 
of several parts but they did not have any further information about the second (and third) 
part.  
The questionnaire consisted of three questions. In Question 1 and Question 2, subjects were 
asked whether they liked taking risks and whether they always tried to avoid risks, 
respectively. Admissible answers were “Agree,” “Disagree” or “Neither agree nor disagree.” 
In the third question, subjects were asked to determine their risk tolerance with greater 
precision by positioning themselves on a scale between 0 (most risk-loving) and 100 (most 
risk-averse) with 50 being chosen as the point corresponding to the risk-neutral case. The 
question most important for the current study was the last one, where subjects had to estimate 
and report their degree of risk aversion. The first two questions were added with the intention 
of making subjects take the time and carefully assess their risk attitude.  
There is a discussion in the literature whether survey questions are a good method for 
measuring risk tolerance with the major concern of many economists being that 
questionnaires are not incentive compatible. Considerable research effort has been dedicated 
to the analysis of the stability of risk preferences across elicitation methods (e. g. Grable and 
Lytton 2001, Kruse and Thompson 2003, Anderson and Mellor 2009, Dhomen et al. 2009). 
Despite methodological differences, all these studies report consistency of risk preferences 
elicited with the help of surveys and economics experiments at least at the aggregate level or 
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at least for some of the subjects. The use of a questionnaire in the current study is justified by 
a twofold argument. First, we are interested in finding out whether a neutrally framed non-
strategic decision situation (the questionnaire) unrelated to the coordination game 
subsequently played influences strategic behavior (Hypothesis 1). That is, we study the effect 
of the act of answering the questionnaire on subsequent strategic behavior and for addressing 
this research hypothesis the exact answers given on the questionnaire are of little importance. 
Second, the design of the experiment allows us to draw some conclusions about the 
behavioral meaningfulness of self-reported personal risk attitudes and thus contribute to the 
discussion of whether survey questions are a good method for measuring risk attitude. In 
addressing our second research hypothesis, we rely on the answers given to the questionnaire 
under the implicit assumption that they provide a good proxy of subjects’ risk tolerance. Our 
findings about the validity of the hypothesis could then be compared to the findings of other 
studies which use similar experimental settings but different risk elicitation procedures (i. e. 
Neumann and Vogt 2009).  Significant experimental evidence favoring the use of 
questionnaires for the elicitation of risk preferences is reported in Dohmen et al. (2009), who 
show that an incentive-incompatible question asking individuals to make a global assessment 
of their willingness to take risks on a scale from 0 to 10 generates a meaningful measure of 
risk attitudes, which maps into actual choices in lotteries with real monetary consequences.  
In treatments four and five, beliefs are elicited using one of the scoring rules reported in 
Murphy and Winkler (1970)—the quadratic scoring rule. Murphy and Winkler (1970) discuss 
two problems related to the suggested scoring rules—flatness and risk neutrality—which 
raise some questions about whether quadratic scoring rules provide an incentive-compatible 
mechanism to elicit beliefs in real experimental settings. McKelvey and Page (1990) suggest 
an experimental design that deals with these problems. First, to relax the assumption of risk 
neutrality they use a lottery version of the scoring rule. Second, to sharpen the incentives of 
the scoring rule, instead of paying a fixed amount for each lottery won, they pay according to 
a sliding scale. Seletn et al. (1999) report, however, that even though money does not induce 
risk-neutral behavior, binary lotteries are found to do even worse. That is why, we decided to 
stick to the original version of the quadratic scoring rule and not to the one suggested by 
McKelvey and Page (1990).  
Taking into consideration the remark of Kahneman and Tversky (1973) that even if subjects 
can quantify their beliefs they might find some form of processing quantitative beliefs more 
meaningful than others, and following Biel (2009), we elicit beliefs by asking about the 
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number of players (from 100) who are believed to choose strategy A rather than about the 
probability with which a single opponent is believed to play a single action. Finally, to 
sharpen the incentives to report one’s true beliefs we set the maximal potential reward for the 
beliefs-elicitation part considerably higher than the maximal remuneration that could be 
achieved in the coordination-game part. To avoid any portfolio or hedging effects, whether 
subjects would be paid for the beliefs elicitation part or for the coordination game part was 
determined by a flip of a fair coin at the end of the experiment. 
 The payoff matrix of the 2 2× coordination game (Figure 1) was presented to the subjects in 
experimental currency units (ECU) where the following exchange rate was used to convert 
them into euros: 
(3) 25 1ECU = euro . 
 
b. Procedure 
 
The experiment was carried out in MaXLab, the experimental laboratory at the University of 
Magdeburg between March and November 2010. Participants were recruited using ORSEE 
software (Greiner 2004) from a pool of mostly students from various faculties. We imposed 
only one restriction on the recruitment process—namely, no economics or management 
students were invited for our experiment. The rationale for this restriction is that we wanted 
our subjects to make their choices in the 2 2×  coordination game based on their real risk 
preferences and beliefs rather than on other considerations, such as which strategy was the 
optimal one according to their game theory classes. None of the invited participants had any 
previous experience with coordination games. Due to the simplicity of the experiment, it was 
carried out on a sheet of paper. All instructions were provided in German. In total, 192 
subjects participated in the experiment—35 in the first treatment, 56 in the second treatment, 
54 in the third treatment, 24 in the fourth treatment and 23 in the fifth treatment. The five 
treatments were run in separate sessions. 
Upon arrival at the laboratory, subjects were seated in a single-person cabin with 
arrangements to ensure their privacy. During the experiment, no communication was allowed 
among the participants. The written instructions were explained to the subjects also orally, 
and they were instructed to raise their hands if they had questions, which were then answered 
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individually. The experiment consisted of one part for the subjects in the first and second 
treatments, of two parts for the subjects in the third and fourth treatments and of three parts 
for the subjects in the fifth treatment. These were as detailed in the previous section. 
Depending on the treatment, the duration of the whole experiment took between 20 and 40 
minutes. 
For filling out the questionnaire, no remuneration was provided. However, subjects were 
instructed that their answers would be used for a research project and they were asked to try 
to be as accurate in their answers as possible. 
In the coordination game part, subjects were individually instructed whether they were row or 
column players and were asked to choose either strategy A or strategy B. To avoid any 
artifacts, all subjects were assigned to be row players. They were also told that their payoff 
depended on the combination of their own strategy and the strategy played by a hidden player 
with whom they were going to be randomly matched once all players completed their strategy 
choices. The matching procedure involved drawing a numbered ball from an urn containing 
n  balls (with n  being the number of subjects in a given treatment) and writing down, in a 
special field on their answer sheets, the number on the ball. The balls in the urn were 
numbered consecutively from 1 to / 2n  and there were two balls with the same number. In 
this way, we matched subjects who had drawn a ball labeled with the same number. 
The payoff matrix presented in Figure 1 and the exchange rate of converting ECU into euros 
given in (3) were used to determine the remuneration for each subject, depending on her own 
strategy choice and that of her randomly matched partner. The maximum payoff subjects 
could earn during the coordination game part of the experiment was 8 euros and the 
minimum payoff was 0 euros. The payoffs depended on the strategies that subjects and their 
randomly matched partners had chosen in the 2 2×  coordination game, where Strategy A was 
the risky strategy, resulting in either the maximum possible payoff of 8 euros or the minimum 
possible payoff of 0 euros and Strategy B was the riskless strategy resulting in a payoff of at 
least 5 euros and at most 6 euros. 
In the beliefs elicitation part of the experiment, subjects were asked to imagine that 100 
individuals played the coordination game presented in Figure 1. They were then asked to 
write down the number of people from 100 (denoted as p ) whom they believed would play 
strategy A. Subjects’ payoff for this part of the experiment was then determined depending 
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on one of the following states of the world: If their randomly assigned partner in the 
coordination game had chosen Strategy A, the euro payoff was calculated with the help of 
formula (4), otherwise the euro payoff was calculated with the help of formula (5). 
(4) 
2
15 15 1
100
p⎛ ⎞− −⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
 
(5) 
2
15 15
100
p⎛ ⎞− ⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
. 
Subjects were told that their payoff would be maximized if they reported their true beliefs. In 
addition, for [ ]0,100p∈ and each state of the world, subjects were shown tables in which 
their payoff was calculated in dependence of p (payoffs were calculated in increments of 5). 
The maximum payoff subjects could earn for stating their beliefs was 15 euros and the 
minimum payoff was 0 euros. The exact payoff depended on p and on the state of the world. 
The average payoff subjects received for this part was around 10 euros. The beliefs-elicitation 
part was always followed by the coordination game and subjects were instructed that at the 
end of the experiment they would be paid either for the beliefs elicitation part or for the 
coordination game part, with the decision being taken on the basis of a fair coin flip. 
 
c. Experimental Results 
 
The analysis of our experimental data involves intergroup comparisons. The crucial 
assumption that allows us to draw valid conclusions on the basis of comparisons between 
treatments is that all groups are identical, meaning that all groups are characterized by the 
same initial distribution of risk preferences. In the general case and for limited sample sizes 
this assumption is not necessarily fulfilled. We therefore directly test whether our sampling 
procedure results in samples characterized by the same initial distribution of risk preferences.  
For this purpose we compare the medians of the answers of question three on the 
questionnaire given by subjects in treatment Q (median = 55) and in treatment Q_G (median 
= 42.5). Using a two-tailed Wilcoxon rank-sum test we cannot reject the null hypothesis that 
the two samples are independent and are drawn from identical continuous distributions with 
equal medians (p-value: 0.88).  
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Result 1: Our sampling procedure generates samples characterized by identical initial 
distribution of risk preferences. 
Based on Result 1 we aggregate the data from treatment Q and treatment Q_G and calculate 
the cumulative distribution function of self-reported risk preferences. Furthermore, we 
characterize the subjects as either risk loving or risk averse according to the following rule: if 
a subject scored on the scale a number between 0 and 50, she is characterized as risk loving, 
and if she scored a number between 50 and 100 she is characterized as risk averse. 
Interestingly, only 1 out of the 89 subjects scored exactly 50 on the scale between 0 and 100. 
Result 2: 53 percent of the subjects reported that they are risk loving and 47 percent reported 
that they are risk averse. 
Similarly, aggregating the data from the beliefs elicitation parts of treatment B_G and 
treatment Q_B_G (it will be later explained why drawing an inference from the aggregate 
data is meaningful) we calculate the sample distribution of beliefs.  
Result 3: 66 percent of the subjects believe that more than 50 out of 100 people will choose 
alternative A on the 2 2×  coordination game, and 34 percent believe that fewer 
than 50 out of 100 people will chose strategy A. 
In treatment B_G and Q_B_G, directly before playing the coordination game, subjects were 
asked to state their first-order beliefs. There is a discussion in the literature whether beliefs 
elicitation alters strategic actions. For example, Costa-Gomes and Weizsäcker (2008) and 
Biel (2009) report only a minor effect on strategic behavior from stating one’s own beliefs, 
while Rutström and Wilcox (2009) find significant evidence that beliefs-elicitation influences 
strategic behavior. However, the result of Rutström and Wilcox (2009) is found to be player 
specific. That is, only players with strong asymmetric payoff opportunities show the beliefs 
elicitation effect. Using the data from treatment G and treatment B_G, we test whether beliefs 
elicitation alters players’ strategy choices. Table 2 reports the proportions of the subjects in 
treatment G and treatment B_G who chose strategy A and B, respectively. 
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 Treatment G Treatment B_G 
Number of participants 56 54 
Strategy A chosen 37 (66%) 15 (63%) 
Strategy B chosen 19 (34%) 9 (37%) 
 
TABLE 2: Distribution of Strategy Choices in the Coordination Game (Treatment G and 
Treatment B_G) 
It can easily be seen from Table 2 that the distribution of strategy choices in both treatments 
is remarkably similar: in treatment G, 34 percent of the subjects chose strategy B and in 
treatment B_G this proportion is equal to 37 percent. Performing a one-tailed Z-test for the 
significance of the difference between the two proportions (
0 1 2
: 0H p p− ≤ , with 
1
0.37p =  
and
2 0.34p = ), we find that we cannot reject the null hypothesis at any usual level of 
significance (z-statistics: 0.30691; p-value: 0.37946). 
Result 4: Beliefs elicitation does not significantly alter strategic behavior in a subsequently 
played coordination game. 
We now address our first research hypothesis. We wanted to discover whether the act of 
answering the questionnaire about one’s own risk preferences influences strategic behavior in 
a subsequently played 2 2× coordination game. This analysis involves comparison of the 
strategy choices made in the coordination game by subjects from treatment G and treatment 
Q_G. Table 3 reports what proportion of the subjects in treatment G and in treatment Q_G 
chose strategy A and B, respectively. 
 
 Treatment G Treatment Q_G 
Number of participants 56 54 
Strategy A chosen 37 (66%) 27 (50%) 
Strategy B chosen 19 (34%) 27 (50%) 
 
TABLE 3: Distribution of Strategy Choices in the Coordination Game (Treatment G and 
Treatment Q_G) 
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We observe that from the subjects (treatment G) who played the 2 2×  coordination game 
straight away, 34 percent chose the riskless strategy B, and from the subjects (treatment Q_G) 
who first answered the questionnaire and then played the game, 50 percent chose the riskless 
strategy B. Using a one-tailed Z-test, we test for the significance of the difference between 
the two proportions (
0 1 2: 0H p p− ≤ , with 1 0.5p =  and 2 0.34p = ). At the 5 percent level of 
significance we reject the null hypothesis (z-statistics: 1.7083; p-value: 0.04379).   
Result 5: The act of answering the questionnaire about one’s own risk preferences changes 
strategy choices made in the subsequently played coordination game. In particular, 
there is significant evidence that the proportion of subjects who choose the riskless 
strategy B increases after answering the questionnaire as compared to the case 
when the coordination game is played straightaway. 
It would be interesting to know through what mechanism this change in strategic behavior is 
induced. Before we address this question, however, we will first investigate the second and 
the third research hypotheses. In Section I, a framework for the analysis of strategy choices 
based on the best-response correspondence of the game was discussed. We argued that a 
strategy choice in the coordination game is a function of risk preferences and beliefs. It is 
interesting, therefore, to examine whether risk preferences and beliefs might predict strategic 
behavior for the average player. 
 To address Research Hypothesis 2, we test whether subjects who choose strategy B have 
different distribution of risk preferences from subjects who choose strategy A. We use the 
data from treatment Q_G and perform test on the medians of the self-reported risk 
preferences on the third question of the questionnaire. The median of the self-reported risk 
preferences of the subjects who played strategy A is equal to 40, while it is equal to 55 for the 
subjects who played strategy B. Using a one-tailed Wilcoxon rank-sum test on the medians 
we find significant evidence at the 5 percent level that subjects choosing strategy B are on 
average more risk averse than subjects choosing strategy A (p-value: 0.0434). 
Result 6: Subjects who choose strategy B are on average more risk averse than subjects who 
choose strategy A. 
Similarly, we address research hypothesis 3 by comparing the medians of the elicited first 
order beliefs of subjects who played strategy A and strategy B, respectively. We used the 
aggregate data from treatment B_G and treatment Q_B_G. The median of the elicited beliefs 
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of the subjects who played strategy A is equal to 85 and of the subjects who played strategy B 
is equal to 42.5. Performing a one-tailed Wilcoxon rank-sum test on the medians, we find 
significant evidence at the 1 percent level that subjects choosing strategy A are on average 
more optimistic than subjects choosing strategy B (p-value: ≈0). 
Result 7: Subjects who choose strategy A hold on average more optimistic beliefs about the 
proportion of people who would play strategy A, than subjects who choose strategy 
B. 
Results 6 and 7 indicate that both risk preference and beliefs could be used to predict 
behavior of the average player. The question, however, why after answering the questionnaire 
more subjects on average choose strategy B still remains. Based on the best-response 
correspondence framework and on results 6 and 7, we know that both risk preferences and 
beliefs are important for the determination of strategy choices. Our presumption, therefore, is 
that the act of answering the questionnaire had changed either risk preferences or beliefs. We 
have already stated that the theoretical effects of beliefs optimism are opposite to those of 
risk aversion. The increase of the proportion of subjects choosing strategy B after answering 
the questionnaire could, therefore, be induced by either an increase of subjects’ risk aversion 
or a decrease in their optimism (i.e., a leftward shift of the distribution of their beliefs). The 
subtle point in our analysis is that not all of the individuals are to change their strategy 
choices after answering the questionnaire. This is so, because it is unlikely that all players are 
characterized by the same coefficient of risk aversion and beliefs’ distribution. The shift in 
either of these variables applies to all players but, depending on the individual risk 
preferences and beliefs, this shift will be large enough to evoke a change in strategy choices 
for only some of them.  
The examination of research hypotheses 4 and 5 sheds more light on the exact reasons behind 
the observed change in strategic behavior. A two-tailed Wilcoxon rank-sum test on the 
medians of the elicited beliefs of subjects in treatment B_G (median = 70) and Q_B_G 
(median = 85) shows that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the two samples are from 
identical continuous distribution with equal medians (p value = 0.1919). This result is the 
reason why we aggregated the data from treatment B_G and Q_B_G for the derivation of 
result 3 and 7. 
Result 8: The act of answering the questionnaire about one’s own risk preferences does not 
change beliefs. 
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Result 8 implies that the observed increase in the proportion of subjects choosing strategy B 
after answering the questionnaire should have been induced by an increase in the subjects’ 
risk aversion. 
Conclusion: Subjects become on average more risk averse when playing the coordination 
game after answering the questionnaire about their own risk preferences.  
IV. Discussion 
 
The results reported in this paper provide several interesting insights which are not only novel 
with respect to the literature on coordination games but also impose a severe test on some of 
the assumptions of standard economic theory. It has been mentioned that, despite the 
profusion of experimental evidence on the equilibrium-selection problem in coordination 
games, to our knowledge no research effort has yet been dedicated to the study of whether 
nonstrategic decision situations encountered by subjects before playing a coordination game 
and not related to it in any obvious way could influence strategic behavior. In result 5, we 
report that a decision situation as simple as a neutrally framed questionnaire about one’s own 
risk preferences does indeed alters subjects’ strategy choices.  
This result violates the internal consistency of preferences assumption of standard economic 
theory which stipulates that, in theoretically equivalent situations, people should always 
choose the same alternative. Furthermore, result 5 challenges the idea that players choose 
strategy choices based on deductive analysis. When faced with the 2 2× coordination game, 
subjects from treatment Q_G have exactly the same information about the game as subjects 
from treatment G. In addition, the two samples are characterized by the same initial 
distribution of risk preferences (result 1) and no preplay communication takes place in any of 
the treatments. In other words, identical groups are faced with the same decision situation but 
contrary to the predictions of deductive principals their distributions of strategy choices 
differ. This result provides strong evidence that players apply some sort of inductive selection 
principles when playing the 2 2×  coordination game. Van Huyck et al. (1990) report 
experimental results showing that, in a repeated coordination game, subjects’ strategy choices 
are influenced by the history of play. We find evidence that a nonstrategic decision situation 
(answering a questionnaire about one’s own risk preferences) not related to the coordination 
game also influences strategic behavior.  
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The conclusion that subjects become on average more risk averse after answering the 
questionnaire about their own risk preferences provides a second challenge to standard 
economic theory which assumes that risk attitudes are stable personality traits. There is a 
considerable amount of research addressing the stability of risk attitudes. The majority of it, 
however, investigates the stability of risk preference either over time, across domains or 
across elicitation methods (e.g. Brunnermeier and Nagel 2008, Vlaev et al. 2009, Nosic and 
Weber 2008, Anderson and Mellor 2009, Dohmen et al. 2009). In the current study, we show 
that a decision situation as simple as reporting one’s own risk preferences in an incentive- 
incompatible questionnaire makes people become on average more risk averse.   
Our results also contribute to the discussion of whether incentive-incompatible survey 
questions are a good method for measuring risk attitude. According to the best-response 
correspondence framework, both risk preferences and beliefs are important for the 
determination of strategy choices. Our intuition, therefore, is that both risk preferences and 
beliefs could be used as predictors of strategic behavior for the average player. Based on the 
self-reported risk preferences on question three of the questionnaire, we indeed find evidence 
that risk attitudes might predict strategic behavior (result 6). This result is different from the 
results of Neumann and Vogt (2009) who do not find significant evidence that risk attitudes 
determine the strategy selection in coordination games. The difference between the two 
studies is that Neumann and Vogt (2009) rely on a measure of risk attitudes based on the 
lottery approach suggested by Holt and Laury (2002), while we use data from a survey 
question. Result 6 provides evidence that an incentive-incompatible survey question about 
one’s own risk preferences is a good method for measuring risk attitude. In addition, the 
difference in our results and the results of Neumann and Vogt (2009) suggests that self- 
reported risk preference might provide a better measure of underlying risk preferences than 
risk preferences elicited with the help of lotteries. 
V. Conclusion 
  
This study reports an experiment where subjects are asked to play a one-shot symmetric 2 2×  
normal form coordination game characterized by two Pareto-ranked pure strategies Nash 
equilibria and one equilibrium in mixed strategies. The experiment is divided into five 
treatments. Depending on the treatment, subjects are asked, in addition to playing the 2 2×
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coordination game, to answer a questionnaire about their own risk preferences or (and) state 
their first-order beliefs.  
We discuss a framework based on the best-response correspondence of the coordination 
game, within which strategy choices and their determinants could be analyzed. The main 
implication of the best-response correspondence framework is that strategy choices are a 
function of risk preferences and beliefs with the theoretical effects of these two working in 
opposite directions.  
The main conclusions to be drawn from the experiment can be summarized as follows. There 
is significant evidence that the act of answering the questionnaire about one’s own risk 
preferences systematically changes strategic behavior in a subsequently played coordination 
game. This result contradicts the internal consistency of preferences assumption. In addition, 
it implies that subjects rely on inductive rather than on deductive principles when making 
strategy choices. We find further that both risk preferences and beliefs could be used to 
predict strategic behavior in coordination games. Finally, our results provide evidence that 
the change in strategic behavior after answering the questionnaire is not induced by a change 
in subjects’ beliefs. We therefore conclude that subjects become more risk averse after 
reporting their own risk preferences. This conclusion raises some questions about the stability 
of risk attitudes assumed by standard theory. 
We demonstrate that strategy choices in coordination games are very sensitive not only to the 
exact game specifications but also to nonstrategic decision situations preceding the 
coordination game and not related to it in any way (such as answering a questionnaire about 
one’s own risk preferences). These results raise some questions about the stability of strategy 
choices in coordination games. Furthermore, our experimental evidence indicates that a non- 
strategic, neutrally framed decision situation as simple as stating one’s own risk preferences 
might have crucial consequences for subjects’ preferences and strategic behavior.  
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Appendix: Written Instructions 
 
Treatment 1 
Welcome to our today’s experiment! Below you can find the description of the experiment. 
Please read the following information very carefully. If you have any questions, please ask 
before the experiment starts. Please note that during the whole experiment, communication 
with the other participants is not allowed. Thank you! 
 
The Experiment 
The experiment consists of one part. Your task is to fill out a questionnaire. Please write a 
chosen from you pseudonym in the upper right box on your decision sheets.  
 
Instructions 
In this experiment, you are asked to answer several questions about your personality. Please 
answer question 1 and question 2 with “Agree”, “Disagree” or “Neither agree nor disagree”. 
In question 3, you are asked to position yourself on a scale between 0 and 100 according to 
your risk preferences, where 0 indicates the maximal risk loving behavior, 100 indicated the 
maximal risk averse behavior, and 50 is the point of indifference. Please note that there are no 
“right” or “wrong” answers. The results are being used in scientific research, so please try to 
be as accurate as possible in answering the questions. 
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Questionnaire 
 
  
1. I like taking risks 
 
o Agree o Disagree o Neither agree nor 
disagree 
 
 
2. I always try to avoid situations 
involving risk 
 
o Agree o Disagree o Neither agree nor 
disagree 
 
 
3. Please position yourself on the 
following scale between 0 and 
100 according to your risk 
preferences, where 0 indicates the 
maximal risk loving behavior, 
100 indicated the maximal risk 
averse behavior, and 50 is the 
point of indifference. 
  
 
          
 
0              10            20            30             40             50            60            70            80           90          100 
Risk loving                                                     “I don’t know”                                               risk averse 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
 
 
 
 
Gender 
 
o Female o Male   
Age 
 
      
 
Pseudonym: 
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Treatment 2 
Welcome to our today’s experiment! Below you can find the description of the experiment 
and then you are asked to make a single decision. Please read the following information very 
carefully. If you have any questions, please ask before the experiment starts. Please note that 
during the whole experiment, communication with the other participants is not allowed. 
Thank you! 
 
The experiment 
The experiment consists of one part. It is conducted on a sheet of paper. Please write a chosen 
from you pseudonym in the upper right box on your decision sheets. Please read the complete 
instructions at first and ask any questions you may have. After that, please make your 
decisions. The information about your payoff is shown to you at the end of the experiment. 
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Instructions 
The following game is played one time. You will be told whether you play as the “Row 
player” or as the “Column player”. Your partner plays the other role. You will be randomly 
matched with your partner upon competition of your decision choice. The table bellow shows 
the game you play: 
 
  Column Player 
  A B 
Row Player 
A (200,200) (0,125) 
B (125,0) (150,150) 
 
You have to decide between the two possible strategies A and B. Your payoff depends on 
your decision as well as on the strategy selected by your partner. There are four possible 
strategy combinations (A, A), (A, B), (B, A), (B, B). In the table above, you can find the 
corresponding payoffs. The first number in a field represents the payoff of the row player and 
the second number represents the payoff of the column player. The payoffs are given in 
points. 
 
Payoff mechanism 
Your payoff depends on the resulting strategy combination. Please note that the payoffs in the 
table are given in points. To convert the given payoffs in Euro please use the following 
exchange rate: 
 
25 Points = 1 Euro 
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Decision 
 
You play as the “Row player”. Please make your decision now. 
 
  Column Player 
  A B 
Row Player 
A (200,200) (0,125) 
B (125,0) (150,150) 
 
 
Please indicate the strategy you choose to play in the field below. 
 
 
 
Now you will be randomly assigned a participants number. Please indicate this number in the 
field bellow. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pseudonym: 
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Treatment 3 
Welcome to our today’s experiment! Below you can find the description of the experiment 
and then you are asked to make a series of decisions. Please read the following information 
very carefully. If you have any questions, please ask before the experiment starts. Please note 
that during the whole experiment, communication with the other participants is not allowed. 
Thank you! 
 
The Experiment 
The experiment consists of two parts. You get separate instructions for each part of the 
experiment. In the first part of the experiment, you are asked to fill out a questionnaire. The 
second part of the experiment is conducted on a sheet of paper. Please write a chosen from 
you pseudonym in the upper right box on your decision sheets.  
At the beginning of each part of the experiment you get the printed instruction for this part. 
Please read the complete instructions at first and ask any questions you may have. After that, 
please make your decisions. The information about your payoff is shown to you at the end of 
the whole experiment. 
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Part 1 
Instructions 
In this part of the experiment you are asked to answer several questions about your 
personality. Please answer question 1 and question 2 with “Agree”, “Disagree” or “Neither 
agree nor disagree”. In question 3, you are asked to position yourself on a scale between 0 
and 100 according to your risk preferences, where 0 indicates the maximal risk loving 
behavior, 100 indicated the maximal risk averse behavior, and 50 is the point of indifference. 
Please note that there are no “right” or “wrong” answers. The results are being used in 
scientific research, so please try to be as accurate as possible in answering the questions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
33 
 
Questionnaire 
 
  
4. I like taking risks 
 
o Agree o Disagree o Neither agree nor 
disagree 
 
 
5. I always try to avoid situations 
involving risk 
 
o Agree o Disagree o Neither agree nor 
disagree 
 
 
6. Please position yourself on the 
following scale between 0 and 
100 according to your risk 
preferences, where 0 indicates the 
maximal risk loving behavior, 
100 indicated the maximal risk 
averse behavior, and 50 is the 
point of indifference. 
  
 
          
 
0              10            20            30             40             50            60            70            80           90          100 
Risk loving                                                      “I don’t know”                                               risk averse 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
 
 
 
 
Gender 
 
o Female o Male   
Age 
 
      
 
Pseudonym: 
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Part 2 
Instructions 
The following game is played one time. You will be told whether you play as the “Row 
player” or as the “Column player”. Your partner plays the other role. You will be randomly 
matched with your partner upon competition of your decision choice. The table bellow shows 
the game you play: 
 
  Column Player 
  A B 
Row Player 
A (200,200) (0,125) 
B (125,0) (150,150) 
 
You have to decide between the two possible strategies A and B. Your payoff depends on 
your decision as well as on the strategy selected by your partner. There are four possible 
strategy combinations (A, A), (A, B), (B, A), (B, B). In the table above, you can find the 
corresponding payoffs. The first number in a field represents the payoff of the row player and 
the second number represents the payoff of the column player. The payoffs are given in 
points. 
 
Payoff mechanism 
Your payoff depends on the resulting strategy combination. Please note that the payoffs in the 
table are given in points. To convert the given payoffs in Euro please use the following 
exchange rate: 
 
25 Points = 1 Euro 
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Decision 
 
You play as the “Row player”. Please make your decision now. 
 
  Column Player 
  A B 
Row Player 
A (200,200) (0,125) 
B (125,0) (150,150) 
 
 
Please indicate the strategy you choose to play in the field below. 
 
 
 
Now you will be randomly assigned a participants number. Please indicate this number in the 
field bellow. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pseudonym: 
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Treatment 4 
Welcome to our today’s experiment! Below you can find the description of the experiment 
and then you are asked to make a series of decisions. Please read the following information 
very carefully. If you have any questions, please ask before the experiment starts. Please note 
that during the whole experiment, communication with the other participants is not allowed. 
Thank you! 
 
The Experiment 
The experiment consists of one part in which you have to make two decisions. You get a 
single sheet of instructions for the whole experiment. The experiment is conducted on a sheet 
of paper. Please write a chosen from you pseudonym in the upper right box on your decision 
sheets.  
Please read the complete instructions at first and ask any questions you may have. After that, 
please make your decisions. The information about your payoff is shown to you at the end of 
the whole experiment. 
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Instructions 
The following game is played one time. You will be told whether you play as the “Row 
player” or as the “Column player”. Your partner plays the other role. You will be randomly 
matched with your partner upon competition of your decision choice. The table bellow shows 
the game you play: 
 
  Column Player 
  A B 
Row Player 
A (200,200) (0,125) 
B (125,0) (150,150) 
 
You have to decide between the two possible strategies A and B. Your payoff depends on 
your decision as well as on the strategy selected by your partner. There are four possible 
strategy combinations (A, A), (A, B), (B, A), (B, B). In the table above, you can find the 
corresponding payoffs. The first number in a field represents the payoff of the row player and 
the second number represents the payoff of the column player.   
Your payoff depends on the resulting strategy combination. Please note that the payoffs in the 
table are given in points. To convert the given payoffs in Euro please use the following 
exchange rate: 
 
25 Points = 1 Euro 
 
Decision 1 
Imagine that 100 subjects play this game.  
Please write down how many subjects (a number p between 0 and 100) out of the 100 
subjects you believe will play strategy A.  
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Payoff mechanism for decision 1 
For the determination of your payoff, you will be randomly matched with a partner. Your 
payoff will be determined according to one of the following two cases: 
Case 1: Your partner has chosen strategy A:  Example for the amount of you payoff in Case 
1 for different values of p : 
 
 
2
100
11515 ⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎝
⎛ −−
p
 
 
p = number of players 
(from 100) whom you 
believe will play strategy  
A 
 p = 0  0,00 Euro p = 55  11.96 Euro 
 p = 5  1,46 Euro p = 60  12.60 Euro 
 p = 10  2,85 Euro p = 65  13.16 Euro 
 p = 15  4,16 Euro p = 70  13.65 Euro 
 p = 20  5,40 Euro p = 75  14.06 Euro 
 p = 25  6,56 Euro p = 80  14.40 Euro 
 p = 30  7,65 Euro p = 85  14,66 Euro 
 p = 35  8,66 Euro p = 90  14,85 Euro 
 p = 40  9,60 Euro p = 95  14,96 Euro 
 p = 45  10,46 Euro p = 100 15,00 Euro 
 p = 50  11.25 Euro  
     
Case 2: Your partner has chosen strategy B:  Example for the amount of you payoff in Case 
2 for different values of p : 
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p = number of players 
(from 100) whom you 
believe will play strategy  
A 
 p = 0  15,00 Euro p = 55  10.46 Euro 
 p = 5  14,96 Euro p = 60  9,60 Euro 
 p = 10  14,85 Euro p = 65  8,66 Euro 
 p = 15  14,66 Euro p = 70  7,65 Euro 
 p = 20  14,40 Euro p = 75  6,56 Euro 
 p = 25  14,06 Euro p = 80  5,40 Euro 
 p = 30  13,65 Euro p = 85  4,16 Euro 
 p= 35  13,16 Euro p = 90  2,85 Euro 
 p = 40  12,60 Euro p = 95  1,46 Euro 
 p = 45 11,96 Euro p = 100  0,00 Euro 
 p = 50  11,25 Euro  
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Please note 
With the above-described payoff mechanism, you (expected) payoff will be maximized if you 
state your true beliefs. 
Decision 2 
You play the game with your randomly assigned partner from Decision 1. 
Payoff mechanism for decision 2: 
Your payoff is determined by the combination of your own strategy choice and that of your 
partner. 
Please note 
You will be remunerated for only one of the two decisions. The decision which will be paid 
out will be randomly determined (by a toss of a fair coin) at the end of the experiment. If 
“heads” falls, Decision 1 will be paid out. If “tails” falls, Decision 2 will be paid out. 
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The Decisions 
Decision 1         
Please make your Decision 1 now.  
 
p =  
   
 
(p = number of players (from 100) whom you believe will play strategy A) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Pseudonym: 
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Decision 2 
You play as the “Row player”. Please make your Decision 2 now. 
 
  Column Player 
  A B 
Row Player 
A (200,200) (0,125) 
B (125,0) (150,150) 
 
 
Please indicate the strategy you choose to play in the field below. 
 
 
 
Now you will be randomly assigned a participants number. Please indicate this number in the 
field bellow. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pseudonym: 
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Treatment 5 
Welcome to our today’s experiment! Below you can find the description of the experiment 
and then you are asked to make a series of decisions. Please read the following information 
very carefully. If you have any questions, please ask before the experiment starts. Please note 
that during the whole experiment, communication with the other participants is not allowed. 
Thank you! 
 
The Experiment 
The experiment consists of two parts. You get separate instructions for each part of the 
experiment. Both parts of the experiment are conducted on a sheet of paper. In the first part 
of the experiment, you are asked to fill out a questionnaire. In the second part, you are asked 
to make two separate decisions. Please write a chosen from you pseudonym in the upper right 
box on your decision sheets.  
At the beginning of each part of the experiment you get the printed instruction for this part. 
Please read the complete instructions at first and ask any questions you may have. After that, 
please make your decisions. The information about your payoff is shown to you at the end of 
the whole experiment. 
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Part 1 
Instructions 
In this part of the experiment you are asked to answer several questions about your 
personality. Please answer question 1 and question 2 with “Agree”, “Disagree” or “Neither 
agree nor disagree”. In question 3, you are asked to position yourself on a scale between 0 
and 100 according to your risk preferences, where 0 indicates the maximal risk loving 
behavior, 100 indicated the maximal risk averse behavior, and 50 is the point of indifference. 
Please note that there are no “right” or “wrong” answers. The results are being used in 
scientific research, so please try to be as accurate as possible in answering the questions. 
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Questionnaire 
 
  
7. I like taking risks 
 
o Agree o Disagree o Neither agree nor 
disagree 
 
 
8. I always try to avoid situations 
involving risk 
 
o Agree o Disagree o Neither agree nor 
disagree 
 
 
9. Please position yourself on the 
following scale between 0 and 
100 according to your risk 
preferences, where 0 indicates the 
maximal risk loving behavior, 
100 indicated the maximal risk 
averse behavior, and 50 is the 
point of indifference. 
  
 
          
 
0              10            20            30             40             50            60            70            80           90          100 
Risk loving                                                      “I don’t know”                                               risk averse 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
 
 
 
 
Gender 
 
o Female o Male   
Age 
 
      
 
Pseudonym: 
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Part 2 
Instructions 
The following game is played one time. You will be told whether you play as the “Row 
player” or as the “Column player”. Your partner plays the other role. You will be randomly 
matched with your partner upon competition of your decision choice. The table bellow shows 
the game you play: 
 
  Column Player 
  A B 
Row Player 
A (200,200) (0,125) 
B (125,0) (150,150) 
 
You have to decide between the two possible strategies A and B. Your payoff depends on 
your decision as well as on the strategy selected by your partner. There are four possible 
strategy combinations (A, A), (A, B), (B, A), (B, B). In the table above, you can find the 
corresponding payoffs. The first number in a field represents the payoff of the row player and 
the second number represents the payoff of the column player.   
Your payoff depends on the resulting strategy combination. Please note that the payoffs in the 
table are given in points. To convert the given payoffs in Euro please use the following 
exchange rate: 
 
25 Points = 1 Euro 
Decision 1 
Imagine that 100 subjects play this game.  
Please write down how many subjects (a number p between 0 and 100) out of the 100 
subjects you believe will play strategy A.  
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Payoff mechanism for decision 1 
For the determination of your payoff, you will be randomly matched with a partner. Your 
payoff will be determined according to one of the following two cases: 
Case 1: Your partner has chosen strategy A:  Example for the amount of you payoff in Case 
1 for different values of p : 
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p = number of players 
(from 100) whom you 
believe will play strategy  
A 
 p = 0  0,00 Euro p = 55  11.96 Euro 
 p = 5  1,46 Euro p = 60  12.60 Euro 
 p = 10  2,85 Euro p = 65  13.16 Euro 
 p = 15  4,16 Euro p = 70  13.65 Euro 
 p = 20  5,40 Euro p = 75  14.06 Euro 
 p = 25  6,56 Euro p = 80  14.40 Euro 
 p = 30  7,65 Euro p = 85  14,66 Euro 
 p = 35  8,66 Euro p = 90  14,85 Euro 
 p = 40  9,60 Euro p = 95  14,96 Euro 
 p = 45  10,46 Euro p = 100 15,00 Euro 
 p = 50  11.25 Euro  
     
Case 2: Your partner has chosen strategy B:  Example for the amount of you payoff in Case 
2 for different values of p : 
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p = number of players 
(from 100) whom you 
believe will play strategy  
A 
 p = 0  15,00 Euro p = 55  10.46 Euro 
 p = 5  14,96 Euro p = 60  9,60 Euro 
 p = 10  14,85 Euro p = 65  8,66 Euro 
 p = 15  14,66 Euro p = 70  7,65 Euro 
 p = 20  14,40 Euro p = 75  6,56 Euro 
 p = 25  14,06 Euro p = 80  5,40 Euro 
 p = 30  13,65 Euro p = 85  4,16 Euro 
 p= 35  13,16 Euro p = 90  2,85 Euro 
 p = 40  12,60 Euro p = 95  1,46 Euro 
 p = 45 11,96 Euro p = 100  0,00 Euro 
 p = 50  11,25 Euro  
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Please note 
With the above-described payoff mechanism, you (expected) payoff will be maximized if you 
state your true beliefs. 
 
Decision 2 
You play the game with your randomly assigned partner from Decision 1. 
Payoff mechanism for decision 2 
Your payoff is determined by the combination of your own strategy choice and that of your 
partner. 
Please note 
You will be remunerated for only one of the two decisions. The decision which will be paid 
out will be randomly determined (by a toss of a fair coin) at the end of the experiment. If 
“heads” falls, Decision 1 will be paid out. If “tails” falls, Decision 2 will be paid out. 
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The Decisions 
Decision 1        
Please make your Decision 1 now.  
 
p =  
   
 
(p = number of players (from 100) whom you believe will play strategy A) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pseudonym: 
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Decision 2 
You play as the “Row player”. Please make your Decision 2 now. 
 
  Column Player 
  A B 
Row Player 
A (200,200) (0,125) 
B (125,0) (150,150) 
 
 
Please indicate the strategy you choose to play in the field below. 
 
 
 
Now you will be randomly assigned a participants number. Please indicate this number in the 
field bellow. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pseudonym: 
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